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REPLY TO THE ARGUMENT
OF THE

HON. JOHN N. PURVIANCE,
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE,
ON THE SUilJECT OF TlIE

BANK OF .PENNSYLVANIA,
IlY GARRICK ~!ALLERY, ESQ.

a

I find that the argument of tho Hon. John N. Purviance, before tho
J ucliciary Committee of the Senate, has been printed and published.
It becomes necessary that the argument in behalf of the Bank, in reply, should also be printed, in order that both sides of the question
. may be fully presented. The eminent talents of the lion. John N.
Purviance, and his long and intimate acquaintance with all the financial affairs of the Comm~nwealth, are calculated to give weight and
importance to all the arguments and suggestions made by him; and it
is fair to presume that such talents, knowledge, and experience, have
presented with the greatest force, all the arguments in fa,,or of the
Commonwealth of which the question is capable, ancl the best grounds
of defence against the rights claimed by the Bank of. Pennsylvania in
her application to the Legislature.
It is import::i-nt to understand the rights which are claimed by the
Bank, as presented in her memorial, and the questions which arise
upon that cla.im, which have been discussed before tho Committee,
that we may see the subject to which the arguments are to be applied,
and perceive the force of their application upon the rea,l questions
under discussion.
The Bank of Pennsylvania, claims that the Act of 13th March,
1830, by which its charter was extended upon tho terms stated in
said act, was a contract between the Commonwealth and the Bank ;
that it contains a grant of the franchise or right of banking, for which
a consideration was paid by the Bank and accepted by the Common•
wealth; and that the sum paid by the Bank amounted to more than
the usual claim upon the cli,·idcnds, had that been adopted as the
mode of payment for the grant; and that the Bank, in point of
equity, should therefore be exempted from any further claim on the
part of the Commonwealth, upon that account; also, that the act referred to being a contract executed between the Commonwealth and
the Bank, any attempt on the part of the Commonwea,lth to alter or
vary it, would be unconstitutional and void.
These are the questions which ha,ve been presented to the Commit;.
tee and to tho Legislature, for their consideration, and which should
be kept in view in this discussion.
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The amount paid by the Bank as a bonus in a loan of four millions,.
at a premium of 5½ per cent., is fully stated in a former printed argument, showing that it exceeds t)ie amount of 8 per cent. upon dividends, had that been charged.
The grounds of the equity of the Bank's application, are stated in
the fqrmer argument, and need not be repeated. In order to rebut
that equity arising out of the extension of the charter of the Bank, by
the Act of 13th of March, 1830, the learned Counsel for the Commomvealth has gone back to the charter of the Bank in 1793, and to
the Act renewing the oharter in 1810, and attempts to borrow from
~
those grants or contracts, some gl'ounds for overcoming the equity
arising out of the acts done by the Bank under the Act '<>f 1830.
It must be remembered that the original charter in 1793, and its
renewal in 1810, were separate, distinct, and independent acts and
grants by the Commonwealth, independent of each other, and totally
1 distinct from the grant in the Act of 1830.
The Act of 1830 gave a new existence to the Bank, with the privileges confened, as much separate from all previous acts as if the Bank
had never before existed. The last act gave a new creation or existence for another period of time, and is good or bad in itself, and must
be decided upon by its own terms and conditions, by the law and the
equity arising out of the terms of the grant, and the acts to be done
by the parties in pursuance of its stipulations.
It is not perceived how former contracts between the parties, which
have long since expired and terminated, can be forced into this discussion to affect the equity arising out of the acts done under the Act of
1830. What the Commonwealth and the Bank agreed upon in 1793
and 1810, was performed, and both parties were satisfied. If the
Commonwealth did not demand in 1793 and in 1810, what she might
have exacted for the grant of the Banking privileges, it can give her
no right to bring that into the account, now in settling the rights and
equities of the parties under the act of 1830. A landlord may give
a lease for a low rent, or for a nominal rent, for a period of years, and
then give a lease for a subsequent term of years, and in settling the
equities of the parties under the last lease, he could not be permitted
to make exactions or demands beyond the terms of the last lease, upon
considerations founded on the former lea.sea, the terms of which had
been performed.
The learned counsel for the Commonwealth, states that "no bonus
was required at either period of renewal, nor was the Bank subject to
any tax whatever;" and again, "the legislation of the State shows that
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the Bank of Pennsyh•ania has been highly favored." Now it is most
r espectfully submitted that what was at any former time a favor, cannot afterwards be made the ground of a legal or equitable claim. If
it was a favor when con~erred, it must remain a favor, and its character cannot afterwards be changed by one party, so as to make it the
foundation of a claim, either directly or by way of set-off. No court
of law or equity has over permitted, what was a favor or a gratuity at
the time, to be subsequently made the foundation of a charge or a matter of defence. Taking the argument of the learned counsel, that there
was favor shown to the Bank in the previous legislation, as correct in
point of fact, nevertheless it cannot upon any principle be brought
into the present account, and can have no possible bearing upon the
decision of the legal or equitable rights of tho parties under the act of
1830, when the parties made a new and distinct contract.
Upon the principle of converting wha,t the lea,rned counsel calls fa-')
vors previously granted by the State to the Bank, into legal or equita- (
ble obligations, he makes up an account of what the bank would have
paid with interest, from her dividends, had she been made subject to 1
such payments by the acts of 1813, 1824, and 1835; and provided tho (
Bank had made as large dividends upon the capital as the Commercial
Bank of P ennsylvania; and provided too, you add a further bonus in \
money, equal to what was paid by another bank, to wit: the Bank of
North America, he makes up a largo aggregate amount. ( See 1:>age
6, of the argument. )
_J
The learnccl counsel further states, ( page 5) that "it will be recollected, that this institution was not made subj ect to the di,,idend tax,
imposed by the acts of 1813, 1824, and 1835, and never made subject
to a dividend tax, until by the a-Ot of the 11th April, 1848." I f by
law, the Bank of P ennsylvania was not subject to the provisions of the ,
acts of 1813, 1824, and 1835, as admitted in the argument, by what
fai1· reasoning can the provisions of those acts be brought into the account by the counsel, to ascertain the equity of the Bank under tho
act of1830? The Bank of Pennsylvania being exempt by law from -1
the provisions of those acts, can by no possibility be chargable with
their provisions, and all calculations made with reference to them
must be founded in error, as they a1·e totally inapplicable to the
present question. If those acts did not apply to the Bank of Penusyl vauia; then the rights and liabilities of the Bank must bo decided
without refet·ence to them; and if those acts are legally excluded from
operating upon this Bank, they are legally excluded from the argu- l.
ment upon this question, as to the rights of the Bank under the act of
1830.
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If arguments can be drawn from any supposed or imaginary sta.temont of facts, without regard to the real facts or the law, the learned
counsel might greatly increase tho result of his calculation, as stat~d
at page 5 ; tho supposed statement may as well be one amount as another, or go to any extent which the imaginat1on can reach.
/ I do not understand the learned counsel to base his calculation upon
any right or legal claim, for he admits that this Bank was not subject
to any charge upon its dividends before 1848; but it is upon the supposition that the Legislature had made those claims from 1818 (which
he admits are not made,) and he now brings into the discussion what
the Legislature never ha-s claimed, and makes up an account without
law, and thus makes the Bank accountable for what he alleges were
favors when granted, and by means of such calculations he proposes to
rebut the equity of the Bank founded on the claim of having paid a
Jionus in 1830 for the extension of her charter.
It is only necessary to repeat here that no claim or defence can
fairly be founded upon any supposed previous favors, to affect the
terms of a subsequent contract.
I do not propose to examine whether there were or were not favors
conferred by the Commonwealth upon this Bank at any previous time,
for which the State clid not receive a compensation, or would have
received a further consideration if the State had at tbe time stipulated
for its payment; for in my bumble opinion, they are considerations
totally foreign to the present inquiry, and have no possible bearing
upon the present sul,ject. If this Bank had the right to establish
branches, so had the Philadelphia Bank a similar right, which she
exercised, and each Bank was e'ntitled to all tho privileges granted
by its charter ; and whether the same were beneficial or not, I do not
deem it necessary to enquire.
/ The learned counsel assigns as a reason why tho Acts of 1813, 1824,
/ ~nd 1835, were not applicable to the Bank of ·Pennsylvania, that the
State owned three-fifths of tho capital stock of tho Bank, "and it was
not therefore the interest of tho State to tax an in~titution in which
she had so large an interest, &c." See page 6, and also page 9, where
' this argument is fully stated.
I admit that this argttment has the merit of novelty to recommend
it. It docs not appear c.er to have been used before ; but it is not
easy to see its force, nor find in it any reason for not imposing the
\.demand of 8 per cent. upon tho dividends of this Bank.
If the Legislature had imposed the tax of 8 per cent., as it is called,
lupon the dividends of the Bank, it would certainly have received that
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amount from the stockholders, without any diminution of the amount]
the State would have received from her own dividends. The dividends
upon ·the State stock, with the 8 per cent upon it, would be equal to
the dividends of the State without the 8 per cent., as both would be/
payable to the Commonwealth, and so long as the whole is equal to all
its parts, the State would have received the same sum from her own
dividends, whether the tax of 8 per cent. wa-s imposed or not, as both
were payable to the Commonwealth; and by imposing such tax of 8
per cent. upon the dividends, the State would have received the income
from the dividends upon the one million of stock owned by the other ,
stockholders, which would have been of as much benefit to the State
as the revenu~ to be derived from any other one million of banking
capital. I t would therefore have been for the interest of the State,
to have made such demand, and it would not have been against good
policy, nor inexpedient, to have required the stockholders to pay the
same as others, if the Legislature had the legal right to make the
demand at the time the Acts of 1813, 1824, and 1835 were passed.
This reason I therefore most respectfully submit has no force, it does
in no manner account for the exemption of the Bank of Pennsylvania. I
from the operation of those Acts.
--./'
The true reason is that the date of the Acts of 1813 and 1824, the
Bank of Pennsylvania had a charter under the Act of 1810, extending
the franchise for 20 years from the 4th of March, 1813, and which
· wa-s in full operation when the Acts of 21st of March, 1813, and of /
1824, were passed. Besides, the operation of those acts is confined to
the banks which were chartered under their provisions, and by their
terms, no banks previously chartered were affected by them. Such
also was the condition of the Bank of Pennsylvania when the Act of
1835 was passed; and no person at those periods supposed that
fw·ther demands could be made upon Banks on account of their
chartered privileges, when the power to make such demands was not
embraced within the provisions of the charters.
· ../
T his, I aver, was the true reason why those acts were not attempted to
be made operative upon this and other banks having charters previously
granted, and upon different terms. It was contrary to the whole course of
legislation to interfere with chartered rights which ha<l been granted.
Another ground upon which the learned counsel seeks a set-off against
the equity claimed by the Bank, of having paid a large bonus for -her charter in 1830, is the sale of the stock of the State at public auction in 1843.
I shall not reply to the insinuation that the Bank had the means to
buy and the power to depreciate, as the learned counsel does not intimate,

I

I
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as he says, that she· acted otherwise than in good faith towards the Com•
monwealth, and which he certainly would not presume to do, in the ab•
sence of all proof lo that effect.
I may be permitted to ask some attention to this argument.
The Commonwealth chose to expose her stock in this Bank to public
sale to the highest and best bidder; and by this act the Commonwealth
showed to the world a want of confidence in the Bank, and a desire to
dispose of the stock at any loss which might arise from a public sale, by
throwing into the market her stock of the original value of one million and
a half of dollars, and that, too, when there was no necessity for the Com•
monwealth to submit to such a sacrifice.
This conduct on, the part of the Commonwealth bad the effect to shake
confidence in the Bank and greatly to depreciate the value of the stock in
the market, and caused many persons to sell their stock as.low as sixty
dollars a share for which they had paid over four hundred dollars.
The loss sust,,ine<l by the Commonwealth, however great, was occasioned by her own acts. The State not only caused a very great loss upon
her own stock, but produced the same effect, to a ruinous extent, to indi•
vidual stockholders.
·
The argument assumes that the Bank, in purchasing a portion of the
stock thus sold at public auction, made no small speculation by the ope•
ration; and that takes away, in some measure at least, any just claim
now set up by the Bank to be relieved upon equitable grounds. (See
page 6.)
This appears to me to be a most singular argument.
If the Commonwealth or indi~iduals expose prc>perty for sale at public
auction, and it sells for the best price that can be obtained, but the owner
sustains a loss, and he does not obtain what the property originally cost
him-that such loss is to be made a claim or set-off, either in law or
equity, against the purchaser, is certainly a novel doctrine. If !he . purchaser either made or Jost by the purchase, it was a matter with which
the Commonwealth can have no concern after the sale was over; the
Co.mmonwealth woul<l have an equal claim against every individual who
purchased at the sale, if anything was macle out of the purchase. Upon
this argument the price bid at the auction, and paid by the purchaser,
would not conclude the rights of the parties, but leave in the seller the
right to inquire afterwards whether the purchaser made anything by his
purchase, and if he did to m.ake claim upon him for it. There must exist
a right to claim, in order to make a set-oif by way of defence, as well as
to sustain a suit. If the Commonwealth has no right, in law or equity, to
claim of the Bank any anything she may have made by the purchase, then
she has no right in law or equity to allege it as a defence against the 1ights
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now claimed by the Bank. If the doctrine set forth in this argument has
any foundation, there would be an end of all sales at auction. No sane
man would purchase at auction and be subject to account if he made anything, and if be lost, bear the loss himself.
There is an error in the statement of the learned counsel, as to the
amount purchased by the Bank, which, however, is not material. She
purchased only to the amount of 716 shares, and whether the Bank made
by the purchase, or to what amount, does not appear. At all events, the
bidding by the Bank was beneficial to the State; it tended to show that
the Bank had some confidence left in the institution, although the State
bad none, and the effect was to raise the price at the sale and thereby benefit the State. Under no supposed state of things could the Bank have
obtained by any purchase made by her, any equivalent for the injury
done to the Yalue of the stock and the credit of the Bank by the sale made
by the State.
Bnt the whole of this inquiry I regard as totally irrelevant to the questions
at i;;sue, for I submit that the Commonweallh sold the stock in her own way,
and the l«;>ss was the result of her own act, and in no manner to be attributed to the Bank. The Slate chose to make the test of its value what it
would bring at auction, and she cannot now bring into the present controversy either its original value or the amount of her loss, nor what the
Bank may have made by the purchase. I therefore humbly submit that
this ground of defence set forth in the argument is totally without foun<la•
tion.

In another part of the argument (page 6,) it is slated, that "the loan of
four millions required by the charter of 1830, and the premium thereon of
~} per ceHt. are mainly relied upon as the equitable grounds to exempt her
from taxation; as to this loan, it may be regarded as taken by the Bank as
the Agent of the Commonwealth, and as it was soon disposed of, it is quite
probable she made money by the operation, and certain it is, there was
great competition the year following to take the loans> and at a higher
premium." The argument continues to slate the increased premiums for
several years, and the application from the Bank to take the loans and the
whole of each loan, and that the premiums paid by the Bank for the loan
rose to more than fourteen per cent. From this slatement the learned
counsel infers that the Bank <lid not pay any bonus for her charter-that
she made a profit out of the loan taken in 1830, and that she has no equity
'
arising out of it.
As to considering the Bank as acting as the agent of the Commonwealth

in taking the loan of four millions at a premium of 6½ per cent., I reply
that there is nothing in the trarrsactron, nor is there any evidence, from
2
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which such agency can be inferred. The transaction itself shows that
the Commonwealth did not treat with the Bank as her agent, gave no
direction to the Bank as her agent, nor paid her as an agent, nor ever required ,>n account as an agent. The Commonwealth has never claimed
.that the Bank was her agent, but bas dealt with her as a principal; and
by the terms of the act of 1830 the Bank, as a contracting party, was
required to acr.ept of the terms of the act, within the time limited.
The idea of a_n agency was never before heard of by any one.
The learned counsel further states, that " the loans were eagerly sought
after, as beneficial to the interests of the.Bank, and upon that ground, we
feel authorised in saying, were taken, and therefore ought not to be re. garded as equivalent to or in lien of a bonus." Reference is here undoubtedly had in the argument to loans takPn by the Bank in 1831
and afterwards; for neither the Bank nor any one else sought for the fou r
million loan at 5} per cent., which is provi<led far in the act extending
·
the charter.
I t certainly does not follow, because the Bank applied for the whole
loans of 1831 and 1832, that she did not pay a bonus in taking the
four millions at 5½ per cent, in 1830. It has never been claimed as a
bonus, that the Bank took the loans in 1831 and 1832, at a higher
premium than was paid in 1830. The argument on behalf of the
Bank has been cqnfined to the taking of the loan of four millions ata
premium of 5½ per cent. under the provisions of the act of 1830, and
that neither prior nor subsequent acts on the part of the Bank or of
the Commonwealth, can vai·y the character or merit of the Bank in
taking that loan.
·
It is not necessary to repeat that the Commonwealth, after _the greatest exertions, could not in 1829 dispose of the loan at par : that the
State was without the means of carrying on her public works : that
upon that·account :i,lone the Legislature was convened before the usual
time: that the Canal Commissioners had issued script to the contractors on the public works, which was at from 15 to 20 per cent. discount.
No Bank or individual sought the loan of the Commonwealth at that
time, and the journals of tha House show that no person could be found
to take it at par.
Upon this part of the case there can be no dispute ; the fact is sustained by overwhelming evidence: indeed it is not disputed in the argument of om· opponents.
·
.
But the argument is, that because subsequent loans were taken by
the Bank at a higher premium, therefore the-taking of the loan in 1830
at a premium of 5½ per cent, which could not be disposed of at par,

is not to be regarded as a bonus; no such conclusion can be fairly drawn
from the premises. If the Bank took the loan in 1830, and engaged
the Barings of London at a high commission, and created a foreign
market for the state loan, and thereby enabled the State to receive a
much larger premi~m in 1831 and 1832, and greatly advance the interest of the State, it may be asked by what fair argument can that
detract from tho merit of the Bank ?
This effect was produced, and by the exertions and good management of the Bank, the state loan, which in 1830 could not bo sold at
par, was taken at 5½ per cent. per annum, and such confi<lcnco and
credit were gi,·en to subsequent loans through the influence created by
tho Bank, that the State received much greater premiums thereafter.
Such benefit conferred upon the state by the Bank, should be regarded
as matter of credit to the Bank, rather than as the means of defeating her just claims.
There cannot he found any instance in tho legislation of this state,
where a single financial operation has produced such vast benefit to the
Commonwealth, as the taking of the loan of 1830 by the Bank, at a
premium of 5½ per cent., and.the subsequently increased premiums received by the Commonwealth through the exertions of the Bank.
An effect upon the State loan was produced, unknown before, and
which soon ceased after the loan went into other hands. It is t.ruoi
the Bank d.id not break by taking the loan, but those into whose hands
the loan went after it left tho Bank, were, some of them, totally ruined, and others suffered irreparable loss, and the State loan soon went
down from 15 9-100 premium, at which tho Bank took it in 1832, to
¼th of one per cent, and from that to par, and never rose to par except in the recent loan connected with the Inclined Place, which did
not exceed 1 per cent. premium.
Whether the Bank made or lost by the loan taken in 1830, it is certain that the result of the operation was very largely beneficial to the
Commonwealth. If the loan of the Commonwealth would of itself
bring a large premium, without any exertions from tho holders of it, it
may be asked why did it not bring a premium in 1829; why did it so
soon fall after it passed from the Bank of Pennsylvania?
I do not consider it mat.rial, so far as regards this question, whether tho Bank made or lost by the loan taken in 1830. I do not know
whether she did or not : nor does the learned counsel pretend to know
how that fact is. He says : " as it was soon disposed of, it is quite probable she made money by the operation. Certain it is, there was great
competition the year following to take the loan, and at higher premi-
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ums." It no where appears in the course of this discussion whether
t he Bank had sold any, or what p:J,rt of the loan of 1830, when the
loan of 1831 was taken: and the learned counsel after all the previous
allegations, says " it is quite probable she made money by the operation." A mere probability unsupported cannot faii:ly be used to defeat
The onl,r thing that the learned counsel asthe rights of the Bank.
serts with certa.inty, is that "there was great competition the year following to take the loan at higher premiums."
So far as tho Bank is concerned, if she had brought tho State loan
into notice in Europe by her exertions, and had sold a small part,
leaving the greater part on hand, her decided interest would have been
to obtain the next loan, and thus to haYe control of the whole of that
· articl"c in the market, and prevent its going into other hands that might
interfere with their arrangements for the sale of it. To have control
of the whole of tho loan, that she ~ight keep up the price, it will
readily be seen was a sufficient motive for the Bank to seek to take the
whole of the next and of the following loans. 1'he motive would certainly be strong, if she had the greater part of the former loan on
h and, the sale of which would be influenced by others holding the
subsequent loan.
.
No fair inference can be drawn from the fact of her subsequent
competition for the loan, which can in any way infillence the bonus of
5½ per cent, paid by the Bank on the four millions in 1830, when it
must be admitted the loan could not at that time be sold at par.
It will be observed that the learned counsel seeks for arguments
founded upon facts which existed long before the time when the charter in question was renewed, and which had passed away before that
time ; and also upon a. state of things that came into existence after
1830, and which did not exist at that time, all of which are totally un1 connected with the present question.
Neither the old favors confered in 1793 and 1810, nor tho subsequent sale of the Commonwcaith's
stock in 1843, nor the price of the stock at any subsequent period,
(matters which could not have been known at that time,) entered into
the negociation of the loan at the premium or the grant of the renewal
of the charter in 1830. It is quite clear that no such considerations
could biwe had any influence at that time, and it may be asked, upon
what principle can they be now brought to bear upon this question?
The learned counsel advances another argument to show that the
payment of the premium of two hundred and twenty thousand dollars
cannot be regarded as a. bonus, which he derives from the discussion
before the Legislature when the bill to obtain the loan and re-charter
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the bank was under consideration. He states at pages 9 and 10,
"that the loan of four millions, or the premium upon it, could not have
been regarded as a boDcuS at the time the charter was granted, appears
by the speeches of two leading gentlemen, members of the H ouse of
Representatives, at the time the charter was granted, &c," and he refers to- Hazzard's Register of Pennsylvania, vol. 5 page 82, to which
I also wisli to refer the reader.
The learned counsel seems to exult 'at the fact that he has found my
own arguments at that time, with which he can overthrow my arguments at this time : and if thalbe so, it should be regarded as perfectly fair, and he is entitled to the full benefit. . But let us pause one
moment, and see if this be so: let us see what was the question before
the committee of the whole when that discussion took place. Arguments may be good and applicable to one question, and without force
when applied to another.
The bill then under consideration was to re-charter the Bank of~
Pennsylvania, and she to loan to the Commonwealth four millions of
dollars. Thero was no mention of :my premium in the bill. The subject of the Bank paying a premium for the loan, was not in the bill
then before the Committee ; it is u"ot mentioned in the discussion ; it \
had not even been spoken of at that time.
. .
..,/
This discussion was on the sixteenth of January, 1830, and the bill
was rep_eatedly under consideration, and the first time that the premium was mentioned as connected with the bill, was on the 12th of
February following, nearly one month afterwards. It cannot be said
that it is pretty clearly stated by me that at the time the charter was
granted that .the four million loan or the premium upon it, was to
be regarded as a bonus ; the mere loan has not been urged a-s a bonus,
and the premium was not mentioned.
I trust the learned counsel will not attribute 'to me the folly and absurdity of discussing a subject that was not then under consideration
and which did not present itself for consideration for nearly one month
afterwards ; and that he will not do the gross injustice to my argument by attempting to apply it to a discussion upon tho subject of the
premium of $220,000 paid upon the loan by the Bank, when no such
matter was under dis·cussion and to which no reference was made. The
first time the subjeet of a premium for the loan was ever connected
with that discussion, it was done by the learned gentleman himself,
and by him alone. I am disposed to believe that the learned gentleman has fallen into the error of supposing that the subject of the premium for the loa:n was in the bill then under discussion, without ad-

[ 14]
verting to the journals which show that the premium to be paid for the
loan
was first brought to the consideration of the House on the 12th of
(
February following, and was substituted for the eight per cent upon
the dividends, which had been befoxe inserted in the bill, as the bonus
to be paid by the Bank. ·
The modes which had been submitted to the Committee of Ways and
Means for raising money are stated in the Register refered to. Efforts
to sell the loan by a Commissioner had been tried and had failed, although it had been strongly recommended by the previous Legislature
and had been adopted.
'
To send an agent to Europe to sell the State Stocks, was abandoned
by all. The stock was not known there, and whether it could be sold
at all, or at any price, was unknown, and the condition of the Commonwealth and the public works did not admit of the delay of a trial
nor of the uncertainty of the result.
'rhe question then was, whether all the Banks of the Commonwealth
should be re-chartered for twenty years, and they take the loan, or
whether one of them, the Bank of Pennsylvania, should be re-chartered and take the loan.
T hat was the subject under discussion, and I said that the extending the ch.arter would benefi.t the stock of the Commonwealth, as the
price of stock would depend on the existence of the institution. The
value of the stock in a bank with a charter is certainly greatei: than in
a bank wi.thout a charter; at that time there was a strong opposition to
the Internal I mprovement System, and it was thought by many that
the surest mode of putting an end to its further progress, was to prevent the State from obtaining money to carry it on ; ti,nd objections
were raised for that purpose, and the project of re-chartering the Bank
of P ennsylvania with the loan, met with
possible opposition, without any available substitute being offered. The objection was made
that the Bank might make a profit from the loan, and to weaken that
objection, I said that if she did, the State would receive three fifths.
I t is also stated that "the. price of the stock may be reduced, and the
Commonwealth in her future operations must take measures to raise its
value or submit to a sale at a depreciated price."
These hypothetical statements in the discussion have no reference to
the payment of a premium of $220,000 by the Bank in lieu of the eight
per cent. upon the dividends, which was the more usual mode of payment for the grant of the franchise for banking.
I feel that I have already devoted too much time to this matter, as it
only requires to be stat~d, to be seen that the lea.med ·counsel can find

all
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no support for his objections from that discussion, as he cannot find the
present question a.ny where raised or mentioned in that debate.
The learned counsel has stated the different suµis which were paid
by different banks at various times to tho Commonwealth for their
charters, and which statement shows that the Commonwealth adopted
no uniform rule of what should be paid, when she departed from the
eight per cent. upon the diYidcnds ; and whether the variation was
matter of favor, or because sho eoul<l get no more, is certainly not
material in the present inquiry whether tho Bank of Pcnnsylvania·in
fact paid a bonus to the Commonwealth which was accepted for the
extension of her charter.
It is again stated, that "all tho banks chartered by the Act of 25th )
:March, 1824, twenty-folll' in number, were chartered under the requirement to make a loan to the State at fivo per cent. interest, &c."
(Seo page 5.) But none of them were required to mako the loan and
pciy a premium upon tlie amonnt, and in that consists the difference.
Tho Bank of Pennsylvania made large loans to tho Commonwealth before 1830, but the loans without any premium paid have never been
claimed by the Bank as a bonus.
It is respectfully submitted that none of these suggestions diminish
the equity of the Bank to claim an exemption from tho payment of a
further sum for the purchase of the extension of her franchise in 1830.
~Iuch is said in the argument about the Bank having had the benefit
of the deposits of the money of the Commonwealth, as well before the
granting of the present charter, as since; but the amount of deposits
at any time, or the benefit to bo derived from them, is the subject of
mere conjecture; nothing, however, is said about the services rendered
by tho Bank in transacting the business of the Commonwealth since
1830. As the equity of the Bank is opposed upon the ground of the
deposits, it is necessary to inquire why the deposits of the State have
been withdrawn from that Bank since August, 1850? By what law,
and by what right, and for whose benefit, have they been taken from
the Bank? IIas not the Bank good cause of complaint upon this subject, if tho deposits are so beneficial, as is alleged by our opponents,
that she has been deprived of that benefit without the authority of law?
Concerning the question of law which is discussed by tho learned
counsel, whether the Commonwealth has the right to impose taxes
upon all property owned by corporations as well as individuals, I have
never denied such a right, but haYo admitted it in the most express
terms. I do not therefore question or oppose tho priociJ?lcs decided
io 4 Peters 515, The Providence Bank, vs. Billings &, Pitman.
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The decision in that case was upon an act of the Legislature of
Rhode Island, "imposing a duty upon licensed persons and others, and
bodies corporate, wi.thiu the State," "and each bank within the State,
except the Bank of the United States, was required to pay for the
use of the state, the sum of :fifty cents on each and every thousand dollars of the capital stock actually paid in."
It will be found by comparison, that the Rhode Island Act very much
resembles the Act imposing what is called the corpora,tion tax, passed
June 11, 1840, Pamphlet laws 612, which imposes a tax upon the capi. tal stock paid in, of all banks, institutions and companies &c., according to the value of the capital stock, which is to be ascertained as
stated in the Act.
The Rhode Island Act imposes a tax of one-half mill upon every
dolla,r of the capital stock paid in, and the Act of Pennsylvania imposes a tax of one-half mill upon every dollar of the capital stock paid
in, where a dividend or profit of one per cent. per annum is made or
declared, and an · additional half mill, when the value of the capital
stock is shown to be greater. The payment of this tax has not been
disputed by the Bank. The right has been conceded to the Common- ·
wealth, to impose a tax upon the capital stock in the Bank, as well
as upon other property made subject to a tax by the same Act.
The decision in 4 Peters ·would apply, if the question was whether
the Bank was liable to the payment of the last mentioned tax upon its
capital stock under the Act of 1840. But it is submitted that it affords no authority to sustain the Act of 1848, which, in its alleged
operation, is to enforce an additional payment f9r the grant of the
renewed charter.
The case of the Commonwealth vs the Ea,ston Bank, 10 Penna. Reports, 442, is also relied ·on by the learned counsel of the Commonwealth, as an authority in this case. Several questions were discussed in that ca,se, and one question which the court decided, was that
the Commomvealth has the right to impose taxes upon all property of
bankt, and the authority upon which the judge chiefly relies, and to
which 1.e refers, is the opinion of the court in 4 Peters; he aJ?plies it
to what the court intended to decide, and it shows what the judge understood to be the question under consideration. He refers to 4 P eters
to show the vital importance of the taxing power, as necessary for the
very existence of government, and the extreme caution with which any
assertion of its relinquishment should be received. It will be seen that
the question of general taxation, was the only one the judge decided,
and to that point alone, the authorities cited by him a,pply.
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The Easton Bank had obtained a renewal of her charter, by an Act
passed April 7, 1835, with an expres~ stipulation in the 4th section,)
which contained the most ample resernition of powers over the bank,
and made it subject to all requisitions as to bonus, or increase of hix
on dividends, to be paid to the Commonwealth as a consideration for
the privileges hereby granted, as now by law arc demanded, or as the
L egislature may rtt any time hereaf'tcr impose.
/
The bank had accepted this charter, and agreed to be subject to all
1
that was at that tiiue dcmandable by law, and the State might claim
that the bank, from the acceptance of this charter, was bound to pay
what was at that time demandable by law, as such was the express
import of the agrnement ; and the court decided also, that the second
~ection of the Act, extending the clmrter of the Easton Bank, did not
repca}, as to that Bank, the provisions of' the Act of' April 1 . 1835.
The question that is now undet· consicleration, was neither raised, discussed, nor decided by the learned judge. It was in no manner
brought to his considera_tion.
The court howel'cr, decided the question of the constitutionality of
the act, upon the general right of the State to impose taxes.
..,1
So far as the right to impose taxes is concern~d, it had been fully ,
exercised by the State, by imposing taxes upon all the property of tho
Bank, and by tho :1ct of 1840, by tho tax upon all the capital stock of
the bank; and now, by the construction gi,·en to the Act of 1848, it is
demanded of this Bank, that she pay 8 per cent. upon the diYiclends,
which bad been stricken from the bill in its passage through the
House, and the 5~ per cent., on the four million loan, or $ 220,000, as
a bonus substituted.
It is now required of the Bank, in addition to the bonus of $:220,000
which has been paid1 to pay also the 8 per cent., and the increased percentage on the di,·idends, for which the $220,000 had been substituted.
I t seems clear that the decision in the case of the Easton Bank1
cannot apply to the case of the Bank of Pennsylrnnia; their charters
and the legislation in reference to them being so tot~lly different.
It is perfoctly manife6t from the whole cour5e of legislation, that the per
centage upon dividends has been required as the consideratir,n for the charters granted, and has been kept entirely distinct from the subject of taxation, although it is called a tax on dividends.
T be act of March 21, 1814, which first introduced the cbim upoff the
dividends as the consideration for the charlers, does not mtntion the payment as a tax, but directs that each bank shall transmit, after the fir:-t
Monday of November, six per cent. on the whole amount of the <lh·ide11cls
3

which shall have been declared <luring the year preceding, to the State
Treasurer. What shows conclusively that the six per cent. upon the dividends was the consideration of the charter, and in no respect ·a tax, is, that
the same section provides tr.at "if any of the annual paJments ~hall not be
made within two months after the first Monday in November, or if no divi-•
dend shall have been declared and made during the preceding year, the'
charier of the Bank so nl'glecling to pay or declare, shall from thenceforth
be absolutely null and void, and of rio effect whatever, &c." See Smith's
Laws, page 165, 166, and Sec. 10 of 1he last mentioned Act. ~y the
24th article of section 3 of tlie Act of March 25, 1824, the same provISi$n'
is again enacted>and the charters of the bauks negleeting to pay o'r fo JJ'e.:
clare <li vi<lends, shall from hencef€>rlh be a-bsolt1tely mzH anai void;- The·
Acts subsequently passed, rechartering. ban~s,. ineorpora'te by e;fyi'ds" re:
ference, the provisions of the Act of March 25,' 1824, and make them
subject to all the regulations, restrictions, penalties and taxes imposed on'
said banks by the Act aforesaid. See Pamphlet Laws of 1824-5, pages
32 and 163; Pamphlet Laws of 1825-6, pages 257 and' 259; Acts of
1826-7, pages 237; Acts of 1828-9-,·pages 116 ·and 249, &c.
From the references in my former argument, in connection with 1he re•ferences here made, it rnust be perfectly manifest that the demand upon
the dividends bas ahiays been made and been received by the State, as
the consideration of the charter. It is thus repeatedly stated in the Acts
referred to; and from the references now made it appears that tlie declar1ing and paying the percentage upon the dividends~ is•necessary to preserve
1 the charters, and a non-compliance is an absolute forfeiture.
The consid-·
eration to be rendered by the banks·w.as an annuat payment, and if the
bank withholds the payment of the consi<leration, then the grant was de\ clared void.
Y- This is certainly inconsistent with the idea of its being in the nature of
a tax imposed by the sovereign power of the State. The import of the Ian-·
guage is,-pay the considt?ration annually an<l you shall·enjoy the grant;
if you fail to pay, the grant shall cease.
It has always been kept separate and distinct from taxation, and has
been exercised under the power reserved in the various charters, a:nd has
not l,efqre been claimed to be demanded under the authority to impose
faxes generally.
I cited 3 Howard's U. S. Reports, page 113, Gordon vs.Appeal Tax
eourt, for the very point that was decided, to wit, "that the charter of a
bank is a franchise which is not taxable as such, (that is, ·no further demand can be made for the grant), if a price ha1, been paid for it, which tbe
Legislature accepted. But the corporate property of the bank is separate
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from the franchise, and may be taxed unless there is a special agreement)
to the contrary."
In that case there was an express exemption of the other property, but
it leaves the principle decided, and for which I contend, unshaken.
All the propertj· of the Bank of Pennsylvania, including the capital
stock paid in, is taxed under the sovereign power of the State to impose
taxes, and there is nothing left to which this claim, call it tax or what you
please, can apply, except to the franchise.
From the charter of the bank itself, and from the Journals of the House,
it is evident that the Ba~k of P~nnsylvania paid a bonus to the State for
the charter of $220,000, and other services stated, which the Common.:
,vealth accepted, and that bonus was in lieu of the fiei centage upori'divi-•
dends, and full consideration according to the c6iitract;- tile· J~tter· was
s'. ricken out ahd the form.er ihserted by the express Act of the· Legislature.
It is respectfully submitted that the State having received and accepted
the bonus contained in the charter, cannot now claim' ihe per centage on
he Ji vi11rn ds, instead of which and in lieu whereof, the $220,000 and
other services have been paid and rendered to the Commoriwealth. I t is
a direct violation of the contract between the parties. The charter is the
contract, and what is not in that instrument is excluded from it. I t is as·
much protected by the Constitution of the United States, as if there had
been an express exemption in the charter. The protection of the Constitution extends as well to implied as to express contracts--(Story on Constitution, v ol. 3, page 2-12, sec. 1371.) The Constitution makes no distinction between ex:press and implied contracts. It equally embraces and
applies to both. The largest portion of the contracts in civil society are
of the description of implied contracts. The force of the objection cannot, therefore, be evaded uppn the ground that there is not an express
exemption in the charter. The course of legislation before referred to,
to, however, shows more than an implied contract could do, that this
Bank was exempt from the per centage upon the dividends.
I ~ is, therefore, most respectfully submitted, that any act which shall
attempt now to enforce the payment of a per centage upon her di vidcnds,
after she ha, paid at. the granting of the charter a bonus in lieu thereof,
and fro n which the Bank is admitted to have been legally exempt (rom the
date of her charter until 1848, is unconstitutional and void.
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The Amount paid by the Banlc ef Pennsylvania to the Commonwealth for
her Charter.
1830.
Bonus 5} per ct. Loan, $4,000,000,
$220,000
Interest to April 15th, 1851,
277,786 74--$497,786 74
Services 21 years, $5,000 per annum, $105,000
Interest on above,
69,579 93--$174,579 93
Amount 15th April, 1851,
Int. on bonus from Aprill 15, to March
30, 1858,
Services 6 years, 38 <lays,
Interest on above,
Amount at 30th March1 1858,

•

$672,366 97
91,996 74
34,780 82
8,44 98-$134 822 54
$807,189 2l

